The Law as Uncopyrightable: Merging Idea and Expression Within the Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis of “Law-Like” Writing by Frohock, Christina M.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
6-25-2019
The Law as Uncopyrightable: Merging Idea and
Expression Within the Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis
of “Law-Like” Writing
Christina M. Frohock
University of Miami School of Law, cfrohock@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information,
please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christina M. Frohock, The Law as Uncopyrightable: Merging Idea and Expression Within the Eleventh Circuit’s Analysis of “Law-Like”
Writing, 73 U. Miami L. Rev. 1269 ()
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol73/iss4/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1269 
The Law as Uncopyrightable: Merging 
Idea and Expression Within the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Analysis of “Law-Like” Writing 
CHRISTINA M. FROHOCK* 
The Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion in Code 
Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. that 
meditates on the law as much as resolves a dispute. For that 
reason alone, attention should be paid. A commission acting 
on behalf of the Georgia General Assembly and the State of 
Georgia filed a copyright infringement action against a non-
profit organization that had disseminated annotated state 
statutes. The Eleventh Circuit took these modest facts and de-
livered a philosophical analysis of the nature of law, finding 
that statutory annotations are outside copyright protection 
because the true author of such “law-like” writing is “the 
People.” The court’s opinion respects democracy by ampli-
fying the voice of the People. Such amplification works best, 
however, on narrow facts. Applied broadly, in line with the 
scope of the court’s philosophy, the opinion risks distorting 
the People’s voice by muting intragovernmental disagree-
ments. That voice is more often cacophony than clarion call, 
and the loudest strain comes from the least representative 
branch. Focusing on the exercise of sovereign authority, a 
different area of copyright law supports the same case out-
come. The law, along with law-like annotations, is uncopy-
rightable because its idea and its official expression merge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Government works lie in the public domain and outside copy-
right protection. From this premise, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit in Code Revision Commission v. Public.Re-
source.Org, Inc. has fashioned a theory of the law that casts “the 
People” as both constructive authors and owners of all laws.1 The 
theory is democratic and inspiring, relying on the foundational notion 
that “Governments . . . deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of 
the governed.”2 Judges and legislators may be authors of the law in 
the practical sense that they put pen to paper and choose the words 
of an opinion or statute. But the People are “the reservoir of all sov-
ereignty,” that is, of supreme authority or power.3 The chosen words 
of judges and legislators carry the force of law only because they 
express the voice of the People as true author.4 Lawmaking is both 
for the People and by the People.5 
                                                                                                         
 1  Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 
1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018). This Article follows the Eleventh Circuit’s conven-
tion of capitalizing “the People.” 
 2  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see Code Revi-
sion Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1240. 
 3  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232; see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (discussing definitions of “sovereignty,” including de facto 
sovereignty as “the exercise of dominion or power” and de jure sovereignty as “a 
claim of right”); see also Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“Supreme dominion, authority, or rule.”); Sovereign, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (“A person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme 
authority.”). 
 4  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239. 
 5  Id. at 1239–40; Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2015) (noting “it would be perverse to interpret 
the term ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the 
people”); see also Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 
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In Code Revision Commission, on a matter of first impression and 
an admittedly close question, the Eleventh Circuit extended this the-
ory of the law to the “law-like” writing of statutory annotations.6 The 
court identified three “hallmarks of law”: (1) the identity of the 
writer, (2) the authoritativeness of the written work, and (3) the pro-
cess of creating the written work.7 Examining the official annotations 
accompanying the Georgia state statutes, the court concluded that all 
three hallmarks indicate that the annotations “are sufficiently law-
like so as to be properly regarded as a sovereign work.”8 Just as stat-
utes are uncopyrightable because they are authored by the People, so 
too are law-like annotations. 
The Code Revision Commission opinion warrants close attention, 
though not for the obvious pressure point of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
parity between statutes and statutory annotations. Before the court 
even describes the law-like nature of annotations, it offers a rich phi-
losophy of the law as expressing the sovereign voice of the People.9 
This initial discussion is eloquent and sweeping. Perhaps too sweep-
ing. The court’s opinion respects democracy by amplifying the voice 
of the People, yet such amplification works best on narrow facts. Ap-
plied widely, beyond the statutory annotations at issue in Code Revi-
sion Commission and in line with the scope of the court’s philosophy, 
the opinion risks distorting the People’s voice by muting intra-
governmental disagreements. The judicial and legislative branches 
often disagree, with courts acting as overseers through judicial re-
view.10 The People’s voice is mythic, closer to cacophony than clar-
ion call. Casting the People as the voice behind all laws yields a dis-
cordant result: the loudest strain comes from the least representative 
branch. 
Code Revision Commission stands as an exemplar of legal writ-
ing and reaches a desirable outcome on the facts, though future pan-
els may entertain another area of copyright law to support the same 
                                                                                                         
19, 1863) (Nicolay Copy) (describing “government of the people, by the people[,] 
for the people”). 
 6  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1233.  
 7  Id. at 1232, 1242.  
 8  Id. at 1233. 
 9  See id. at 1239–41. 
 10  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see infra 
notes 123–35 and accompanying text. 
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outcome. This Article will first describe the Eleventh Circuit’s opin-
ion and the Supreme Court precedent establishing the law as uncopy-
rightable. Next, the Article will show how the logic of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion approaches a reductio ad absurdum, specifically, 
that the People speak most loudly through the judiciary. Finally, the 
Article will offer an alternative approach based on the merger doc-
trine to decide the predicate facts of Code Revision Commission. 
Copyright law protects expressions rather than ideas. The law, along 
with law-like writing, is uncopyrightable because its idea and its of-
ficial expression are inseparable. Application of the merger doctrine 
here is unconventional, but promising. 
I. THE LAW AS UNCOPYRIGHTABLE 
A. Georgia’s Copyright Claim 
The dispute in Code Revision Commission arose from the unau-
thorized dissemination of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated 
(the “Code”).11 The Code contains the text of statutes enacted by the 
General Assembly of Georgia, alongside annotations.12 Statutory an-
notations comprise a variety of secondary authorities, including “his-
tory lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case nota-
tions, editor’s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of 
opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory 
opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.”13 Although 
the annotations are not primary authorities and do not carry the force 
of law, they do carry legal significance.14 The Code itself declares 
the merger of statutes and annotations within the bound series, and 
the State of Georgia publishes both as “a single, unified edict.”15 The 
                                                                                                         
 11  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1234–35. 
 12  Id. at 1233. 
 13  Id.; see Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Re-
source.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2015), rev’d, 906 F.3d 
1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 15 Civ. 2594) (“The copyrighted annotations include 
analysis and guidance that are added to the O.C.G.A. by a third party publisher of 
the O.C.G.A. as a work for hire. These annotations include synopses of cases that 
interpret the O.C.G.A., summaries of Opinions of the Attorney General of Geor-
gia, and summaries of research references related to the O.C.G.A.”). 
 14  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1233. 
 15  Id. at 1233, 1248. 
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annotations shine a necessary research light, guiding the interpreta-
tion of statutes and legislative history.16 
The State of Georgia acquired its statutory annotations through a 
code publishing contract with Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., a mem-
ber of the LexisNexis Group (“Lexis”) that publishes legal re-
sources.17 Lexis agreed to pay all costs for editing, publishing, and 
distributing the Code in exchange for an exclusive publishing right 
over both hard copies and electronic copies.18 Lexis paid the cost of 
editorial freedom, as well. Acting through its Code Revision Com-
mission, Georgia placed a firm supervisory hand on Lexis’ work.19 
The code publishing contract included instructions on creating, com-
piling, and arranging the annotations, and the Code Revision Com-
mission controlled the final product.20 Critical for the present dis-
pute, Georgia also held the copyright in its own name over “all cop-
yrightable parts of the Code.”21 
Despite this copyright and publication lockdown by Georgia and 
Lexis, the Code remained available.22 Certainly, the statutes did. The 
general public could read the full statutes on the internet any time.23 
Under the terms of its contract, Lexis posted online an unannotated 
version of the Code free of charge.24 The statutory annotations were 
also available, but less easily and freely. The general public could 
read the entire Code in libraries and universities throughout the state, 
and state agencies could distribute any portions of the Code within 
their administrative purview.25 A private actor, however, could not 
distribute the Code without infringing on the state’s alleged copy-
right.26 
                                                                                                         
 16  See id. at 1248–49 (“The annotations’ combination with the statutes means 
that any understanding of the statutory text arrived at without reference to the 
annotations is axiomatically incomplete.”). 
 17  Id. at 1234. 
 18  Id.; see Amended Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 10. 
 19  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1234. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  See id. at 1235 (discussing the Commission’s cease and desist letters to 
Public.Resource.Org for alleged copyright infringement). 
1274 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1269 
Enter Public.Resource.Org (“PRO”). PRO is a nonprofit organi-
zation dedicated to “Making Government Information More Acces-
sible.”27 With pro bono support from law firms, grants from various 
foundations, and an online invitation to contribute a tax-deductible 
donation, PRO works to expand public access to government records 
and materials.28 Its website includes “A Proposed Distributed Repos-
itory of All Primary Legal Materials of the United States,” a televi-
sion network for the federal judiciary, and a call to action for the U.S. 
House of Representatives to “provid[e] broadcast-quality video of all 
hearings and the floor.”29 In 2013, PRO purchased the Code in print 
form, scanned all 186 volumes including supplements, and uploaded 
the scanned pages to its website for free and unfettered access.30 PRO 
also mailed USB drives containing the Code to Georgia legislators 
and distributed copies to other private organizations and websites in 
the hope of wider distribution.31 
Not surprisingly, the Commission sent cease-and-desist letters to 
PRO, invoking Georgia’s copyright in all parts of the Code so copy-
rightable.32 The state focused its demand on the statutory annota-
tions, as all parties agreed from the outset “that the Georgia statutes 
and the statutory numbering are not copyrightable.”33 Again not sur-
prisingly, PRO refused to cease or desist, taking the position that no 
part of the Code is copyrightable “because the law cannot be copy-
righted.”34 On July 21, 2015, acting on behalf of both the Georgia 
                                                                                                         
 27  PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2019). 
 28  Id.; Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1234–35. 
 29  Law.Gov, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/law.gov/in-
dex.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019); The Federal Judicial Center, PUBLIC.RE-
SOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/fjc.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2019); The House of Representatives, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.re-
source.org/house.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019). 
 30  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235; Code Revision Comm’n v. Pub-
lic.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906 
F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018); see Amended Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 15. 
 31  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment at 1, Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (No. 30-
2594); see Amended Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 14 (“Plaintiff does not assert 
copyright in the O.C.G.A. statutory text itself since the laws of Georgia are and 
should be free to the public.”). 
 34  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
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General Assembly and the State of Georgia, the Commission filed 
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
against PRO for copyright infringement.35 
The Commission sought an injunction requiring PRO to remove 
all “infringing materials from the internet” and preventing any future 
infringement.36 Decrying PRO’s “well-laid plan” to challenge Geor-
gia’s copyright, the Commission invoked the state’s copyright pro-
tection over “the original and creative annotations of the uncopy-
rightable state’s laws,” annotations that the state viewed as clearly 
“not the law.”37 PRO responded by admitting the facts; it had pub-
lished the Code as alleged.38 PRO also effectively confirmed the 
Commission’s depiction of a well-laid plan, as it had “proudly 
scanned and posted online” the Code.39 But PRO denied that those 
admitted facts gave rise to any claim because Georgia did not hold a 
valid copyright in the Code.40 Alternatively, PRO argued that (1) the 
Code annotations lacked sufficient originality and creativity to be 
distinct from the basic idea of statutory annotations, and (2) its pub-
lication was fair use.41 PRO also filed a counterclaim, asking the 
court to declare that Georgia holds no enforceable copyright in any 
portion of the Code.42 PRO argued that only if the entire Code is 
“free, available, and useable to all” can individuals enjoy fair and 
equal access to the laws of the State of Georgia.43 Undeterred by the 
lawsuit, PRO subsequently purchased the 2015 Code and uploaded 
                                                                                                         
 35  Id.; see Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment, supra note 33, at 1. 
 36  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment, supra note 33, at 2–3; Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 37  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment, supra note 33, at 1–2. 
 38  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 39  Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 1, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 
3d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 29-2594). 
 40  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235; Defendant’s Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 39, at 5–11. 
 41  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1233; see Plaintiff’s Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 33, at 1; 
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, supra note 39, at 11–24. 
 42  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 43  Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 39, at 2. 
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all those volumes and supplements to its website.44 For good meas-
ure, PRO also archived them on the internet.45 
On competing summary judgment motions, the district court con-
cluded that because the statutory annotations in the Code are not en-
acted into law and do not carry the force of law, they are not in the 
public domain.46 Accordingly, the court granted partial summary 
judgment to the Commission and rejected PRO’s challenge to Geor-
gia’s copyright.47 The court also rejected PRO’s argument of insuf-
ficient originality and affirmative defense of fair use.48 The court 
then issued a permanent injunction against PRO, enjoining “all un-
authorized use, including through reproduction, display, distribution, 
or creation of derivative works,” of the Code, ordering that PRO “re-
move all versions of the [Code] from its website,” and ordering that 
PRO end all fundraising connected with its publication of the Code.49 
PRO appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. There, the nonprofit found a receptive audience. Its mission 
statement that all aspects of the law belong to the People flourished 
into a judicial opinion that all aspects of the law are spoken by the 
People.50 
B. The Sovereign as Author  
The Eleventh Circuit identified its “ultimate inquiry” in Code Re-
vision Commission to be “whether a work is authored by the People, 
meaning whether it represents an articulation of the sovereign 
will.”51 The district court had paid little mind to sovereign author-
ship, as it looked to Georgia law’s own distinction between statutory 
law and nonstatutory commentary to situate annotations squarely 
                                                                                                         
 44  Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 1356; see Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 47  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 48  Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1355–61; see Code Revision 
Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 49  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1235. 
 50  See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, supra note 39, at 2 (“The law belongs to the people . . . . Making 
the O.C.G.A. free, available and useable to all allows everyone, whether he or she 
is a lawyer or layperson, journalist, teacher or student, part of a nonprofit charita-
ble entity or a multinational corporation, or merely a concerned citizen—every-
one—to better understand, use, and comply with the law.”). 
 51  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232. 
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outside the law and inside copyright protection.52 Painting on “a rel-
atively clean canvas,” the appellate court looked directly to the Cop-
yright Act.53 
Authorship enjoys pride of place in both the Constitution and the 
Copyright Act.54 Acting on its constitutional authority to “secur[e] 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries,” Congress has extended 
copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible means of expression.”55 Indeed, the protected copyright 
vests initially and immediately “in the author or authors of the 
work.”56 
In Code Revision Commission, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted 
the term “author” for certain government works to mean “the Peo-
ple.”57 No citation follows that interpretation, and the court admitted 
that the precedents “establishing this doctrine are far from clear.”58 
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance on copyright author-
ship, driving the Eleventh Circuit to dust off nineteenth-century case 
law. Three opinions from the 1800s shed light on the issue of who 
owns the law. 
First, in the 1834 case of Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court 
pondered the “novel” and “interesting” questions surrounding 
whether its official reporter could assert and convey a copyright in 
Wheaton’s Reports, his publication of the high court’s opinions.59 
The parties disputed whether Wheaton himself had contributed any-
thing creative, and the Court remanded to determine “whether the 
                                                                                                         
 52  See Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1356–57 (“Furthermore, a 
transformation of an annotation into one uncopyrightable unit with the statutory 
text would be in direct contradiction to current Georgia law.”). 
 53  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239. 
 54  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 201 
(2012). 
 55  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 56  17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 57  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1236. 
 58  Id.; see also id. at 1232 (noting without citation that “all agree that a state’s 
codification cannot be copyrighted because the authorship is ultimately attributa-
ble to the People”). 
 59  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654, 667–68 (1834). 
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said Wheaton as author, or any other person as proprietor,” had sat-
isfied all requisites of the Copyright Act of 1790.60 In remanding, the 
Court allowed for the possibility of a copyright interest in Wheaton’s 
Reports.61 But not in every page. The opinion ended by clarifying 
that the Reports’ core component was off limits from private owner-
ship: “the court are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or 
can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this 
court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any 
such right.”62 Wheaton could seek copyright protection over his 
“marginal notes and abstracts of arguments,” but nothing more.63 
Whatever the copyright statute required in terms of performance or 
conferred in terms of benefits, the law was outside its reach.64 
More than fifty years passed quietly on the issue. In 1888, the 
high court again waded into the interesting intersection between cop-
yright law and the law in Banks v. Manchester.65 There, the Court 
extended its Wheaton view to state court opinions.66 Banks raised the 
                                                                                                         
 60  Id. Compare Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 593 (“The complainants in their 
bill state, that Henry Wheaton is the author of twelve books or volumes, of the 
reports of cases argued and adjudged in the supreme court of the United States, 
and commonly known as ‘Wheaton’s Reports.’”), with id. at 648 (“Mr. Wheaton 
undertook the preparation and publication of the reports of the decisions of the 
court, under the appointment of the court. He furnished nothing original from his 
own mind.”); see Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 648 (1888) (In Wheaton, 
“[t]his court held (1) that the plaintiffs could assert no common-law right to the 
exclusive privilege of publishing, but must sustain such right, if at all, under the 
legislation of [C]ongress; (2) that, under such legislation, there must have been, 
in order to secure the copyright, a compliance with the provisions of the statute in 
regard to the publication in a newspaper of a copy of the record of the title of the 
book, and in regard to the delivery of a copy of it, after publication, to the [S]ec-
retary of [S]tate.”). 
 61  Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 648–49 (“If this court had been of opinion that there 
could not have been a lawful copyright in the volumes of Wheaton’s Reports, it 
would have been useless to send the case back to the Circuit Court . . . .”). 
 62  Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 668. 
 63  Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 650. 
 64  Id. at 649 (“Therefore, the only matter in Wheaton’s Reports which could 
have been the subject of the copyrights in regard to which the jury trial was di-
rected was the matter not embracing the written opinions of the court, namely, the 
title-page, table of cases, head-notes, statements of facts, arguments of counsel, 
and index.” (emphasis added)). 
 65  128 U.S. 244 (1888). 
 66  Id. at 253–54. 
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issue of whether a reporter for the Supreme Court of Ohio could ob-
tain and convey “a copyright, for the use of the State,” in the publi-
cation of the court’s opinions and decisions, including the statement 
of the case and the syllabus.67 The U.S. Supreme Court found that 
the entire publication “was exclusively the work of the judges” and 
that “the reporter was not the author of any part.”68 Accordingly, the 
copyright claim failed.69 
The Court left open the question of whether the State of Ohio 
could claim a copyright for itself, but answered forcefully the ques-
tion of whether judges could do so here: No.70 The Ohio judges may 
have supplied the exclusive work for publication, but “[i]n no proper 
sense” did they fill the statutory role of author.71 Effectively, the 
Ohio law volumes lacked any author at all. As a matter of public 
policy and “always . . . a judicial consensus,” copyright law did not 
reach any writing “by judicial officers in the discharge of their judi-
cial duties.”72 Quoting its unanimous view in Wheaton, the Court in 
Banks concluded with a description of all judicial writing in the pub-
lic domain: “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the au-
thentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every 
citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of 
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.”73 
One month after Banks, the Supreme Court decided Callaghan v. 
Myers and again considered whether volumes of state law reports are 
copyrightable.74 There, a publishing firm brought suit for copyright 
infringement against competitors that had published the Illinois Re-
ports.75 The Reports contained opinions of the Supreme Court of Il-
linois, as well as “a large amount of matter original with” the court 
                                                                                                         
 67  Id. at 245, 251. 
 68  Id. at 251–52 (“Mr. De Witt . . . was not the author, inventor, designer, or 
proprietor of the syllabus, the statement of the case, or the decision or opinion of 
the court.”). 
 69  Id. at 252. 
 70  Id. at 253. 
 71  Id. (“In no proper sense can the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares 
the opinion or decision, the statement of the case, and the syllabus, or head-note, 
be regarded as their author.”). 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 617 (1888). 
 75  Id. at 623. 
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reporter.76 In addition to compiling and arranging legal work from 
the judges, the reporter had prepared a case syllabus or headnotes, a 
statement of case facts, and a table of cases cited and decided.77 The 
reporter conveyed his copyright interest in the Illinois Reports to the 
plaintiff publishing firm, and that firm did not look kindly on the un-
authorized publication of imitation volumes as “piracies on the cop-
yrights of the plaintiff.”78 Faithful to the theme of Wheaton and 
Banks, the defendants offered the “broad proposition . . . that these 
law reports are public property, and are not susceptible of private 
ownership.”79 Simply put, the court reporter “was not an author” for 
copyright purposes.80  
Reaching the opposite outcome from Wheaton and Banks, the 
Supreme Court in Callaghan found the copyright valid.81 The differ-
ence in Callaghan was factual rather than analytical: the reporter for 
the Supreme Court of Illinois had contributed original work. The 
Court found that, other than the court opinions, every part of the Illi-
nois Reports was “the work of the reporter, and the result of intellec-
tual labor on his part.”82 Accordingly, as author, he could obtain a 
copyright over all parts other than the judicial opinions.83 The law 
remained outside copyright’s grasp. 
On the legislative side, Congress has settled the issue of copy-
right protection over federal government work. There is none. The 
Copyright Act provides that “[c]opyright protection . . . is not avail-
able for any work of the United States Government.”84 For the work 
                                                                                                         
 76  Id. at 620. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. at 621–22. 
 79  Id. at 645. 
 80  Id. at 646–47. 
 81  Id. at 663. 
 82  Id. at 645; see id. at 647 (finding “no ground of public policy on which a 
reporter who prepares a volume of law reports, of the character of those in this 
case, can, in the absence of a prohibitory statute, be debarred from obtaining a 
copyright for the volume which will cover the matter which is the result of his 
intellectual labor”). 
 83  Id. at 650. 
 84  17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“Copyright protection under this title is not avail-
able for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Gov-
ernment is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it 
by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”); see id. § 101 (defining “work of the 
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of a state government, the precedents of Wheaton, Banks, and Calla-
ghan still apply.85 Copyright law does not extend to state “govern-
ment employees who are possessed of particular powers, namely the 
ability to promulgate official, binding edicts,” when they are prom-
ulgating such official, binding edicts.86 
Even with a trio of Supreme Court opinions and a federal statute 
in hand, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Code Revision 
Commission confronted an age-old rule with only “implicit and un-
stated” foundations.87 Government works are uncopyrightable, but 
why? To answer this question, the court looked to “first principles 
about the nature of law in our democracy.”88 With citations ranging 
from The Declaration of Independence to James Madison in The 
Federalist to President Abraham Lincoln in The Gettysburg Address 
to Chief Justice John Marshall to Alexis de Tocqueville, the Eleventh 
Circuit described a philosophy of popular sovereignty.89 Judges and 
legislators draft the law, but only as authorized delegates and “serv-
ants of the People.”90 Whatever our servants produce not only be-
longs to us, but expresses our voice.91 The court describes the People 
as “the true authors” and “the constructive authors” of all laws, and 
writes favorably of a sister court’s description of the People as met-
aphorical authors.92 However lofty the description, the implication 
for copyright protection is clear. The People are “ultimately the 
source of our law,” and so the People are authors of the law, and so 
                                                                                                         
United States government” as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the 
United States government as part of that person’s official duties”).  
 85  See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 
1238–40 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that Congress’ “partial codification of Banks for 
works created by the federal government leaves unmodified the rule as it applies 
to works created by the states”).  
 86  Id. at 1246; see id. at 1251 (“A speech delivered by a judge, depending on 
the circumstances of the address, may or may not count as a work created by a 
government employee.”). 
 87  Id. at 1239. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. at 1239–40. 
 90  Id. at 1239. 
 91  Id. (“When the legislative or judicial chords are plucked it is in fact the 
People’s voice that is heard.”). 
 92  Id. at 1239, 1241 (citing First Circuit Court of Appeals in Bldg. Officials 
& Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980), for “met-
aphorical concept of citizen authorship”). 
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the People are owners of the law.93 Thus, the law “is intrinsically 
public domain material and is freely accessible to all so that no valid 
copyright can ever be held in it.”94 
On the facts of Code Revision Commission, the Georgia statutes 
present an easy, prototypical case.95 Although elected officials 
drafted the statutes as a matter of fact, the People are authors as a 
matter of law.96 De facto authorship derives from a pen; de jure au-
thorship derives from sovereignty. Statutory annotations present a 
difficult, novel case, inhabiting “a zone of indeterminacy” between 
government work that carries the force of law and government work 
that does not.97 If such work is “sufficiently like the law” so as to be 
deemed an expression of the People’s voice, then copyright protec-
tion does not apply.98 Considering the annotations at issue, the Elev-
enth Circuit identified three “critical markers” to identify the law: 
(1) the identity of the writer, (2) the authoritativeness of the work, 
and (3) the process of creating the work.99 All three support the con-
clusion that the Georgia statutory annotations “are part and parcel of 
the law.”100 
First, the Eleventh Circuit identified the writer of the annotations 
as the heavy hand behind the drafting hand.101 Granted, private indi-
viduals at Lexis write the annotations.102 But Lexis has so little cre-
ative license under the terms of its code publishing contract with the 
state that “the Georgia General Assembly is the driving force” behind 
                                                                                                         
 93  Id. at 1239–40. 
 94  Id. at 1240. 
 95  Id. at 1242.  
 96  Id. at 1233. 
 97 Id. at 1242. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. at 1232 (“[W]e rely on the identity of the public officials who created 
the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work 
was created.”); id. at 1242 (“Put simply, there are certain things that make the law 
what it is. The law is written by particular public officials who are entrusted with 
the exercise of legislative power; the law is, by nature, authoritative; and the law 
is created through certain, prescribed processes, the deviation from which would 
deprive it of legal effect.”). 
 100  Id. at 1243. 
 101  See id. at 1243–48. 
 102  Id. at 1243. 
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the writing.103 The writer “in a powerful sense” is the Georgia legis-
lature itself.104 Second, the annotations are “authoritative sources on 
the meaning of Georgia statutes,” necessary for a complete and ac-
curate understanding.105 These interpretive tools appear within the 
Code alongside statutes, and the unified publication is “stamped with 
the state’s imprimatur.”106 Finally, the process of creating annota-
tions is “very closely related” to the process of creating statutes.107 
Pursuant to statute, the Georgia General Assembly voted to adopt 
annotations as “an integral part” of the Code, and each year the Gen-
eral Assembly votes to reaffirm the status of the Code as the official 
codification of state laws.108 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, therefore, that the statutory an-
notations in Georgia’s Code “are attributable to the constructive au-
thorship of the People.”109 The annotations are “intrinsically public 
domain material, belonging to the People, and, as such, must be free 
for publication by all.”110 Case reversed, vacated, and remanded.111 
Georgia’s copyright claim failed.112 
II. IDEA AND EXPRESSION OF THE LAW 
A. Distorting the People’s Voice 
A strong policy argument supports the result in Code Revision 
Commission.113 The law does not bind in a vacuum. Statutes and 
                                                                                                         
 103  Id. 
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 1248–49 (internal quotation omitted); see id. at 1250–52. 
 106  Id. at 1248. 
 107  Id. at 1252; see id. at 1252–54. 
 108  Id. at 1253. 
 109  Id. at 1255. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id.; see Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that “public ownership of the law means precisely that ‘the law’ 
is in the ‘public domain’ for whatever use the citizens choose to make of 
it[,] . . . not only to guide their actions but to influence future legislation, educate 
their neighborhood association, or simply to amuse”); Josh Blandi, Who Owns the 
Law?, ABA L. PRAC. TODAY (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.lawpracticeto-
day.org/article/who-owns-law-access-justice/. 
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court opinions must be promulgated, interpreted, understood, and de-
bated. Divining meaning from the language of the law requires ref-
erence to “context, structure, history, and purpose,” together with 
common sense.114 Accordingly, the law comprises the words of stat-
utes and opinions, as well as annotations and any other “part and par-
cel” provided by the government to illuminate those words.115 An 
informed public must have easy and free access to the law in this full, 
meaningful sense. Otherwise, the law stands as a foreign language 
with its official translation manual under lock and key.116 Copyright 
should not erect a barrier between the public and the laws that bind 
it.117  
Of course, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion renders less lucrative a 
code publishing contract like that between Lexis and Georgia. Incen-
tives will shift without copyright protection for the end product, and 
parties may bargain for other benefits under the contract itself. Or 
companies may eschew state contracts altogether. The opinion does 
leave room for private authors—removed from the state’s editorial 
control, official stamp, and legislative vote—to claim copyright pro-
tection over all the annotations they care to write. Such independent 
and original works remain purely secondary authorities, discussing 
rather than resembling the law. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is even more laudable from a 
democratic perspective, as it rests on a foundational concept of pop-
ular sovereignty and amplifies the voice of the People to deny copy-
right protection.118 On the facts of Code Revision Commission, that 
voice amplifies smoothly. The people of Georgia spoke through their 
                                                                                                         
 114  Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (construing language 
of federal gun statute) (internal quotation omitted). 
 115  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1243. 
 116  See id. at 1249 (noting that “a full understanding of the laws of Georgia 
necessarily includes an understanding of the contents of the annotations”) (em-
phasis added). 
 117  See Blandi, supra note 113 (“The issue of access to the law goes beyond 
locating cases and statutes online: It is not just about finding the laws but is also 
about pairing them with annotations, history, metadata, and parallel citations that 
make cases and statutes more meaningful and helpful.”). 
 118  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239–40, 1252. 
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elected legislators to author both the state statutes and the accompa-
nying annotations.119 There, the legislature was the only governmen-
tal branch at work.120 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that its phi-
losophy of popular sovereignty would apply equally to the legislative 
and judicial branches, as “[s]tatutes and judicial opinions are the 
most obvious examples of what falls within the ambit of the rule.”121 
Both legislative enactments and case opinions represent “the quin-
tessential exercise of sovereign power.”122 Yet, combining those stat-
utes and opinions becomes problematic. Looking beyond the narrow 
facts of Code Revision Commission and hearing the People’s voice 
through both the legislative and judicial branches at once, the sound 
amplifies into a distortion. The voice cracks on a grander stage. 
Since at least 1803, when Chief Justice Marshall famously artic-
ulated the function of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, the 
courts and the legislature have engaged in a dialogue to promulgate 
the law.123 As coordinate branches, neither side may ride roughshod 
over the other.124 But on matters within “the range of judicial cogni-
zance,” the courts’ review function gives judges the final word.125 
On constitutional questions, in particular, “the federal judiciary is su-
preme in the exposition of the law.”126 Although a federal court will 
grant Congress’ view “the most respectful consideration,” the court 
makes its own determination whether Congress has acted within its 
                                                                                                         
 119  See id. at 1254–55. 
 120  See id. 
 121  Id. at 1242. 
 122  Id. at 1232; see id. at 1239. 
 123  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).  
 124  See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the Court is not justified in substituting 
its own views of wise policy for the commands of the Constitution, still less is it 
justified in allowing Congress to disregard those commands as the Court under-
stands them.”). 
 125  Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569 (1911) 
(cautioning that “[t]he scope of judicial inquiry in deciding the question 
of power is not to be confused with the scope of legislative considerations in deal-
ing with the matter of policy”). 
 126  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
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powers.127 A court may act even when the legislature remains pas-
sive.128 Like their federal counterparts, Georgia state courts also ex-
ercise judicial review, dating back to the early 1800s.129 In fact, the 
Georgia Constitution includes a Judicial Review Clause, granting the 
judiciary the power to declare void any legislative acts in violation 
of the state Constitution or the federal Constitution.130 
On the Eleventh Circuit’s view of authorship, the People speak 
through both the legislative and judicial branches just as they “gov-
ern themselves through their legislative and judicial representa-
tives.”131 Yet, conflicts between the governmental branches are in-
evitable on constitutional questions, transforming the voice of the 
People from clarion call to cacophony. For a few recent examples, 
the high court has stepped in to rule on controversial legislation con-
cerning health care, same-sex marriage, and gun control.132 Judicial 
review resolves those conflicts in favor of the courts’ view.133 The 
bench wins. Constitutions may be amended. But for now, as stakes 
                                                                                                         
 127  Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Congress’ discre-
tion is not unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as they have 
since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority 
under the Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] 
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the 
federal balance.”). 
 128  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (recognizing that 
“[a]n individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is 
harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to 
act”). 
 129  See, e.g., Lathrop v. Deal, 801 S.E.2d 867, 883 (Ga. 2017) (noting that 
“[b]y 1861, the doctrine of judicial review had been employed by Georgia courts 
for several decades”). 
 130  GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. V. 
 131  Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1239 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
 132  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574–75 (2012) 
(finding individual mandate in Affordable Care Act constitutional “because it can 
reasonably be read as a tax”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013) 
(finding the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (finding District of Columbia gun-control stat-
utes unconstitutional). 
 133  See, e.g., Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 574–75; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775; Heller, 
554 U.S. at 635. 
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rise in interpreting the fundamental law, the loudest voice of the sov-
ereign People comes from the distant branch: judges. Although Geor-
gia elects its judges,134 some state judges and all federal judges are 
unelected.135 The voice from the bench is at once most and least rep-
resentative. 
B. Revisiting the Sovereign as Author 
This implication from Code Revision Commission is odd—and 
perhaps avoidable. There may be a different route, steering away 
from the potential reductio ad absurdum in the Eleventh Circuit’s 
People-as-author theory while maintaining the policy-friendly case 
result.136 And the Eleventh Circuit itself suggests the direction. The 
Code Revision Commission opinion contains the germ of another 
idea within copyright law: merger. 
Just before analyzing the law-like nature of statutory annotations, 
the Eleventh Circuit states that “[w]hether or not a work is subject to 
the rule is dependent on whether the work is the law, or sufficiently 
like the law, so as to be deemed the product of the direct exercise of 
sovereign authority, and therefore attributable to the constructive 
authorship of the People.”137 Omitting the final, italicized clause 
avoids entanglements arising from the People’s voice expressed on 
all sides of intragovernmental disagreements. Why are government 
works uncopyrightable? Because they are a direct exercise of sover-
eign authority. Ockham’s Razor slices off the answer there, before 
any authorship of the People.138 
                                                                                                         
 134 See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. I (“All superior court and state court 
judges shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis for a term of four years. All Justices 
of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Court of Appeals shall be elected on 
a nonpartisan basis for a term of six years.”). 
 135  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that President may nominate, 
with advice and consent of Senate, “Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States”); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 
(2015) (“Our Founders vested authority to appoint federal judges in the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and entrusted those judges to hold their 
offices during good behavior. The Constitution permits States to make a different 
choice, and most of them have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate 
judges at the polls.”). 
 136  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239–40. 
 137  Id. (emphasis added). 
 138  See 9 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 735 (Edward Craig ed., 
1998) (“Ockham’s thought consistently shows a strong drive towards ontological 
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Taking a cue from the Eleventh Circuit, we focus the analysis on 
authorship. The sovereign is author. Full stop. The court dives deep, 
but we can run a copyright analysis without probing the ultimate 
source of the law.139 The Framers designed our government as a com-
prehensive system, diffusing power among three coequal 
branches.140 The fact that one branch is more or less representative 
of the People does not affect the exercise of sovereign authority 
within that branch. Sovereign authority, not representation, is key. 
Indeed, the concept of sovereignty is broader than popular sover-
eignty, as shown beyond the shores of the U.S. judicial branch. There 
are ways to structure a legitimate government other than of, by, and 
for the People. Kings, for example, derive their just powers from 
God.141 Divine right would render the Almighty the author for copy-
right purposes. But, then, would public ownership eclipse divine 
ownership? Could a deity suffer an infringement? We are getting far 
afield. Fortunately, we need not complicate matters by looking be-
hind the individuals exercising sovereign authority to identify the 
root of their authority and, thus, the true, constructive, or metaphori-
cal author of laws. No need to pull back the curtain. Laws are in the 
public domain whether issued from a democracy or a monarchy or 
otherwise. With any sovereign as author, copyright protection still 
fails to reach the law and law-like writing on an alternative basis: the 
merger doctrine.142 Government works lie in the public domain be-
cause the idea and the official expression of the law are insepara-
ble.143 
                                                                                                         
economy and that he did on many occasions use the razor (which he himself for-
mulated either as ‘a plurality should never be posited without necessity’ or as ‘it 
is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer’).”); see also Acorda 
Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(O’Malley, J., concurring) (“As Ockham’s Razor advises, the simpler path is usu-
ally best.”). 
 139  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1239. 
 140  See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). 
 141  See Divine Right of Kings, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“The political theory that the sovereign is a direct representative of God and has 
the right to rule absolutely by virtue of royal birth.”). 
 142  Merger Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 143 See id. 
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Taking another cue from the Eleventh Circuit, we begin with first 
principles embedded in the relevant opinions.144 The idea of the law 
includes certain essential aspects, without which the idea itself col-
lapses.145 One such aspect is that the law is expressed. The Supreme 
Court in Banks recognized this aspect as self-evident: “the law” may 
take the form of either “a declaration of unwritten law, or an inter-
pretation of a constitution or a statute.”146 A constitution or a statute 
is already written, with a notable exception of the British Constitu-
tion.147 By contrast, unwritten law must be declared to achieve legal 
status.148 
Declaration does not limit the sources of law. To say that the law 
is expressed is not to foreclose unannounced common-law principles 
or unarticulated rights. The common law is a rich source of rules and 
indeed often synonymous with “unwritten law.”149 While cautioning 
against reading too far into the Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
long “acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in 
enumerated guarantees,” including the right to be presumed innocent 
and the rights of privacy and association.150 These “important but 
                                                                                                         
 144  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232 (“To navigate the ambigui-
ties surrounding how to characterize this work, we resort to first principles.”). 
 145  Cf. Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479, 484–85 (1905) (analyz-
ing sentence “The King of France is bald” and observing that “if we allow that 
denoting phrases, in general, have the two sides of meaning and denotation, the 
cases where there seems to be no denotation cause difficulties both on the assump-
tion that there really is a denotation and on the assumption that there really is 
none”). 
 146  Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). 
 147  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 367 
(2012). 
 148  See Banks, 128 U.S. at 253; Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 
U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (observing that “courts of a state have the supreme power to 
interpret and declare the written and unwritten laws of the state”). 
 149  See, e.g., Levy’s Lessee v. McCartee, 31 U.S. 102, 110–11 (1832) (“It is 
too plain for argument, that the common law is here spoken of in its appropriate 
sense, as the unwritten law of the land, independent of statutable enactments.”); 
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 626 (1834) (noting in copyright context that “the 
source of exclusive ownership is therefore found in positive enactments, and not 
in any unwritten law”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 717 (2008) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that certain state “laws were not only thought con-
sistent with an unwritten common-law gun-possession right, but also consistent 
with written state constitutional provisions”). 
 150  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579–80 (1980). 
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unarticulated rights . . . share constitutional protection in common 
with explicit guarantees” because they are fundamental to the enjoy-
ment of those explicit guarantees.151 The document is greater than its 
text.152 In nontextual circumstances, courts and Congress do the 
work of expression, reading between the lines or outside the four cor-
ners.153 Such expression often takes the form of a writing, but other 
forms suffice.154 
Expression of the law raises another essential aspect: the law is 
binding. Again, the Supreme Court in Banks recognized this aspect 
as self-evident: “the law, which, binding every citizen . . .”155 Simi-
larly, the Eleventh Circuit in Code Revision Commission described 
laws as “official, binding edicts.”156 Nonlegal commands impose 
their own restraints and, in truth, may fit better with the word “laws.” 
The laws of physics, for example, are inescapable.157 Morality and 
religion offer robust normative codes that can certainly feel inescap-
able. Adherents may pray (or insist) that the legal code overlaps. The 
Eleventh Circuit focuses on a law’s official status rather than its merit 
                                                                                                         
 151  Id. at 580; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting 
that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”). 
 152  See AMAR, supra note 147, at 97 (“In addition to reading between the lines 
of the text and pondering the specific procedures by which the text was enacted 
and amended, we must take account of—and take a count of—how ordinary 
Americans have lived their lives in ordinary ways and thereby embodied funda-
mental rights.”). 
 153  See id. at 47, 136 (noting that “we must read the Constitution as a whole—
between the lines, so to speak” and describing authority of courts and Congress 
to recognize new rights from the “lived Constitution”). 
 154  See, e.g., Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1331 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “Florida law does not require 
that a criminal judgment be in writing” but may be pronounced in open court, and 
citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.700). 
 155  Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). 
 156  Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1246 
(11th Cir. 2018); see id. at 1247 (noting “the promulgation of binding legal 
edicts”); id. at 1249 (noting “binding legal effect”); id. at 1250 (noting “the status 
of binding law”); id. at 1252 (noting “the process by which the statutory provi-
sions were made into binding law”). 
 157  See generally JIM AL-KHALILI, PARADOX: THE NINE GREATEST ENIGMAS 
IN PHYSICS 34–38 (2012) (discussing rules of quantum mechanics). 
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or demerit: edicts bind every citizen, regardless.158 The legal system 
is distinct and emits its own normative pull.159 
The link between expressed law and binding law is strongest in 
the criminal context. The Constitution contains an Ex Post Facto 
Clause precisely because substantive laws should not bind in retro-
spect.160 The Clause was “intended to secure substantial personal 
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action.”161 It is un-
just to “punish[] as a crime an act previously committed, which was 
innocent when done,” to retroactively change the definition of 
crimes, or to increase the punishment for crimes previously commit-
ted.162 Even for nonpenal legislation, there is a centuries-old pre-
sumption that laws apply only prospectively absent specification oth-
erwise.163 
Expression, then, is an essential aspect of the law and linked to 
its binding effect, always prospective and rarely retrospective. But 
the idea of the law as essentially expressed raises a question: Who 
provides the expression, most often in writing? Certainly, anyone can 
                                                                                                         
 158  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116–17 (3d ed. 2012) (“The so-
ciety in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in 
the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking it could not exist or for 
denying it the title of a legal system.”); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE DETERMINED 132 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 1998) 
(“The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another.”). 
 159 See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 
YALE L.J. 2, 79 (2011) (“Law is indeed a normative social practice.”). 
 160  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
(1 Dall.) 386, 399 (1789) (recognizing that “the true construction of the prohibi-
tion extends to criminal, not to civil, cases” because “[i]t is only in criminal cases, 
indeed, in which the danger to be guarded against, is greatly to be apprehended”); 
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925) (emphasizing that Ex Post Facto Clause 
is “not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which 
do not affect matters of substance”). See generally Ex Post Facto, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining adjective entry as “[d]one or made after 
the fact; having retroactive force or effect”). 
 161  Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915). 
 162  Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169–70; Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 
(1990); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (noting that 
“the nature of judicial review requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each 
case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a new rule,” but that “after 
we have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review 
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review”). 
 163  See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842–44 
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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put pen to paper and write down words that read like an edict. Novels 
contain laws governing the characters in their fictional worlds.164 But 
not just anyone can express what the Eleventh Circuit rightly calls 
“official, binding edicts.”165 The law is special, unlike other collec-
tions of words in that the law is “an authoritative work that governs 
people’s lives.”166 And the only one who can perform the magic trick 
of expressing such an authoritative work is the sovereign. 
The Supreme Court in Banks is again instructive. There, the 
Court described “the whole work done by the judges” as “the authen-
tic exposition and interpretation of the law.”167 “Interpretation” pre-
sumes a preexisting law, and judges serve as interpreters on a daily 
basis.168 Statutes must pass judicial review, while lower-court opin-
ions may be affirmed or reversed. Common-law adjudication per-
forms an “evolutionary process” on rules announced by judges in the 
first place.169 At that first announcement of a rule, a judge’s work is 
different: making new law or declaring unwritten law.170 Here, the 
Supreme Court’s use of “authentic exposition” is telling.171 Both 
                                                                                                         
 164  See, e.g., J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE TWO TOWERS 438 
(50th Anniversary ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2004) (1954) (“Yet I am not free to 
do all as I would. It is against our law to let strangers wander at will in our land, 
until the king himself shall give them leave, and more strict is the command in 
these days of peril.”). 
 165  Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1246 
(11th Cir. 2018); see id. at 1247, 1249–50, 1252. 
 166  Id. at 1251. 
 167  Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). 
 168  See id. 
 169  See Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984) 
(recognizing that “common-law heritage” of New York Times v. Sullivan rule “as-
signs an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to specific factual situa-
tions” and noting that the rule “is given meaning through the evolutionary process 
of common-law adjudication; though the source of the rule is found in the Con-
stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law”). 
 170  See id.; see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 178 (1990) (noting 
that courts have “authority to expand or contract a common-law doctrine where 
necessary to serve an important judicial or societal interest”); Livingston v. Jef-
ferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1811) (describing common-law principle 
as “a principle of unwritten law, which is really human reason applied by courts, 
not capriciously, but in a regular train of decisions, to human affairs, according to 
the circumstances of the nation, the necessity of the times, and the general state 
of things”). 
 171  Banks, 128 U.S. at 253. 
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terms are part of ordinary language. “Authentic” is defined as “pos-
sessing authority that is not usu[ally] open to challenge,” with less 
common definitions including “legally valid” and “of an origin that 
cannot be questioned.”172 The primary definitions of “exposition” are 
“a setting forth of the meaning or purpose” and, specifically for a 
law, “an expounding of the sense or intent.”173 When judges make or 
declare law, they expound with authority and validity.174 With all due 
respect to the bench, other writers could provide a similarly eloquent 
account. But the work of judges is distinct because the judiciary’s 
exposition of the law is of unquestionable origin: it originates in sov-
ereign power. 
More than a century after Banks, and apparently comfortable 
with legal positivism, the Eleventh Circuit makes this point repeat-
edly through Code Revision Commission: “Legislators and judges, 
unlike other government workers, are peculiarly entrusted with the 
exercise of sovereign power to write or officially interpret the 
                                                                                                         
 172  Authentic, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (5th ed. 
1993). 
 173  Exposition, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (5th ed. 
1993). 
 174  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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law.”175 A sovereign must act through the individuals who hold of-
fice, and only those individuals can express the law.176 More specif-
ically, individuals who hold office can express the law only when 
acting in their official capacities.177 
In this regard, the power of sovereign lawmaking is akin to the 
protection of sovereign immunity. When an individual acts in his of-
ficial capacity, he is shielded from certain laws.178 As the Supreme 
Court has explained, the relief sought in an official-capacity claim 
“is only nominally against the official and in fact is against the offi-
cial’s office and thus the sovereign itself.”179 The government entity 
rather than the named official is the real party in interest, which “is 
                                                                                                         
 175  Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1247 
(11th Cir. 2018); see id. at 1232 (legislative enactment and judicial opinion “rep-
resent the quintessential exercise of sovereign power”); id. at 1246 (recognizing 
“the works of certain government employees, which is to say government em-
ployees who are possessed of particular powers, namely the ability to promulgate 
official, binding edicts” and noting that “the government official must be en-
trusted with unique powers beyond those possessed by the typical government 
employee, such as the power to pronounce official interpretations of the law”); id. 
at 1247 (noting that “the rule in Banks is concerned with works created by a select 
group of government employees, because only certain public officials are empow-
ered with the direct exercise of the sovereign power”); id. at 1247 n.3 (noting that 
“[s]overeign power isn’t delegated to the government at large—it is given to spe-
cific public officials to exercise in particular ways”); id. at 1248 (recognizing that 
“Georgia General Assembly is not simply composed of ordinary government em-
ployees but rather of public officials whose official duties peculiarly include the 
direct exercise of sovereign power”); id. at 1251 (describing “a work made in the 
exercise of the sovereign power to make or interpret the law”); see also LON L. 
FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 114 (1968) (“The legal positivist concentrates his 
attention on law at the point where it emerges from the institutional processes that 
brought it into being.”); HART, supra note 158, at 94–95 (describing “rule of recog-
nition” for binding rules); AUSTIN, supra note 158, at 18–19 (describing laws as 
commands from superiors to inferiors). 
 176  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1251–52 (contrasting a judge’s 
speech off the bench with a judge’s work on the bench and stating that “[o]nly 
those works that derive from the legitimate exercise of sovereign power, such as 
official interpretations of the law and the law itself, are assigned authoritative 
weight”). 
 177  See id.  
 178  See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017) (discussing tribal sov-
ereign immunity and advising that “in the context of lawsuits against state and 
federal employees or entities, courts should look to whether the sovereign is the 
real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit”). 
 179  Id. at 1292. 
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why, when officials sued in their official capacities leave office, their 
successors automatically assume their role in the litigation.”180 Graft-
ing this distinction from sovereign immunity to sovereign lawmak-
ing, nominal authorship of the law rests with the official, while real 
authorship rests with the office and thus the sovereign itself. That is 
why, when judges or legislators leave office, their successors auto-
matically assume their role in the exposition and interpretation of the 
law. The opinion in Banks still issues from the Supreme Court long 
after the honorable service of the Justices who drafted it.181 
Thus, sovereign authorship amounts to a conditional statement: 
if an edict is the law, then it is expressed by officials exercising sov-
ereign power. In other words, official expression is inherent in the 
idea of the law. In copyright words, the idea encompasses the expres-
sion. 
This entanglement of idea and expression is just what takes the 
law outside copyright protection. Courts have long recognized the 
axiom that copyright “protection is given only to the expression of 
the idea—not the idea itself.”182 The First Amendment promotes the 
free flow of information and ideas, while an author enjoys a limited 
monopoly on his original expression.183 Congress has codified this 
balance in the Copyright Act: “In no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
                                                                                                         
 180  Id. 
 181  See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). 
 182  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 
99, 103 (1879) (analyzing copyright infringement claim over bookkeeping system 
and noting that where the information a book “teaches cannot be used without 
employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are 
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary 
incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public”); Whelan Assocs., v. Jaslow 
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233–35 (3d Cir. 1986) (analyzing copyright 
infringement claim over computer program); Digital Commc’ns Assocs., v. 
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 457–58 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (analyzing 
copyright infringement claim over computer program). 
 183  See Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 614, 621–
22 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
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or embodied in such work.”184 So long as the idea/expression dichot-
omy obtains, copyright protection applies and covers only particular 
expressions.185 Ideas remain in the public domain.186 
Under the doctrine of merger, the idea/expression dichotomy col-
lapses, pulling copyright infringement claims down with it.187 There 
is no mechanical formula for merger. As Judge Learned Hand la-
mented, decisions regarding the idea/expression dichotomy must 
“inevitably be ad hoc.”188 But decisions must be made.189 Under the 
merger doctrine, copyright protection does not apply “when an idea 
and its expression are so closely connected that there is only one way 
to express the idea.”190 To prevent a monopoly on ideas, the expres-
sion loses protection “in those instances where there is only one or 
so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression 
would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.”191 The Elev-
enth Circuit, for example, has found the arrangement of the “yellow 
pages” telephone directory uncopyrightable based on the doctrine of 
                                                                                                         
 184  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 185  See Infodek, 830 F. Supp. at 621–22. 
 186  See id. 
 187  See Merger Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 188  Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960) (“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone 
beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’”); see BUC Int’l 
Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007) (“At the 
margins, the distinction between idea and expression can be subtle and difficult.”). 
 189  See Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489; BUC Int’l Corp., 489 F.3d at 1143. 
 190  Portionpac Chem. Corp. v. Sanitech Sys., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245 
(M.D. Fla. 2002); see BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. 
Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993); BUC Int’l Corp., 489 F.3d at 
1144 (finding that selection of section headings in yacht listing “did not merge 
with the larger idea of describing a yacht”). 
 191 BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Kregos v. 
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)); see Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. 
Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1518 n.27 (11th Cir. 1997) (considering 
printed directory of cable television systems and finding that “expression of the 
principal community selection has merged with the idea, and thus the selection of 
principal communities is uncopyrightable”); Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 
793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that “[i]t is on the basis of the merger 
principle that copyright has been denied to utilitarian ideas, such as forms”); see 
also Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that “because ideas are substantively excluded from the protection of the 
Copyright Act, they do not fall within the subject matter of copyright”). 
2019]  THE LAW AS UNCOPYRIGHTABLE 1297 
merger “[b]ecause this is the one way to construct a useful business 
directory.”192 
Similarly, there is only one way to construct a law: sovereign au-
thorship. Because the sovereign office is author of the law—regard-
less of whether the People serve as backstop—there is no idea of the 
law separate from its official expression. A law without sovereign 
authorship is no law at all, rather a collection of words by another 
writer or a Platonic ideal that binds no one. Just as the arrangement 
of the “yellow pages” merges with the idea of a business directory, 
the official expression of the law merges with the idea of the law and, 
thus, is uncopyrightable.193 
In the case of the law, the doctrine of merger applies for the same 
reason as in other cases: copyright protection is unavailable because 
idea and expression are inseparable.194 This inseparability arises 
from the very nature of the idea at issue. The Eleventh Circuit did not 
discuss merger in Code Revision Commission, other than relying 
heavily on the fact that the Georgia Code merges its statutes and an-
notations within a unified publication.195 But the lower court did.196 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected 
the merger doctrine in one paragraph.197 In response to PRO’s sum-
mary judgment argument that the Code annotations lacked sufficient 
originality, the court found that “there are a multitude of ways to 
write a paragraph summarizing a judicial decision, and further, a 
                                                                                                         
 192  BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1442 (“the arrangement has 
‘merged’ with the idea of a business directory, and thus is uncopyrightable”); see 
Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463–64 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (rejecting copyright claim for exact copy of map lines because “the 
idea of the location of the pipeline and its expression embodied in the 
1:250,000 maps are inseparable and not subject to protection”); Matthew Bender 
& Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publ’g, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(rejecting copyright claim for arrangement of information within legal treatise). 
 193  See BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 999 F.2d at 1442. 
 194  See generally Merger Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 195  See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 
1232–33, 1245, 1248–49, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2018); see also id. at 1233 (“Be-
cause we conclude that no copyright can be held in the annotations, we have no 
occasion to address the parties’ other arguments regarding originality and fair 
use.”). 
 196  Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 
1350, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 197  Id. 
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multitude of ways to compile the different annotations” in the 
Code.198 True enough. But off point. The district court’s observation 
does not defeat merger because the underlying framework here is 
unique.  
In a conventional instance of merger, there is only one way or 
very few ways to express an idea, which any author can offer.199 The 
law presents an unconventional instance of merger. For the law, there 
are many ways to express the idea, which only one author can offer. 
Legislators and judges have a multitude of word choices when draft-
ing laws. Still, their expression is uncopyrightable because it is an 
essential aspect of the idea of the law.200 No other expression counts 
as the law, and there is no law without the expression.201 Accord-
ingly, the People are free to copy the chosen words, precisely and 
completely.202 
So where does all this leave statutory annotations, the law-like 
writing at issue in Code Revision Commission? Exactly where the 
Eleventh Circuit put them: outside copyright protection. The Elev-
enth Circuit’s three markers of the law all imply that statutory anno-
tations were “made in the exercise of sovereign power”: (1) “the of-
                                                                                                         
 198  Id. 
 199  See BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 
F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 200  See Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232. 
 201  See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “majority of cases 
have . . . followed the method in which merger becomes an issue only when the 
two works in question—the copyrighted one and the alleged infringement—ap-
pear on the surface to be similar, and under which merger is used as a reason for 
denying all copyright protection to the plaintiff and thereby excusing the defend-
ant’s use of a similar or even identical expression”). But see C.B. Fleet Co. v. 
Unico Holdings, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (describing 
merger as a defense to infringement claim rather than as a basis to deny copyright 
protection in the first place, and stating “merger defense does not apply in in-
stances where the infringing work is virtually identical to the copyrighted work or 
when the coordination of facts provided in the work are a result of independent 
testing”). 
 202  See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1332 
(11th Cir. 2005) (noting that “the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation” 
requires a presumption that “legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there” (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 
176, 183 (2004))). 
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ficial who created the work is entrusted with delegated sovereign au-
thority,” (2) “the work carries authoritative weight,” and (3) “the 
work was created through the procedural channels in which sover-
eign power ordinarily flows.”203 When a work is properly viewed as 
authored by the sovereign, idea and expression merge to take the 
work outside copyright protection. The Eleventh Circuit concluded 
from its three-prong analysis that statutory annotations “would be at-
tributable to the constructive authorship of the People, and therefore 
uncopyrightable.”204 The merger analysis above alters only a few 
words of the court’s conclusion: annotations would be attributable to 
sovereign authorship, and therefore uncopyrightable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Code Revision Commission 
makes good law on good facts. Both the law and law-like writing 
belong in the public domain, and there is ample support from a policy 
perspective and a legal perspective to reach this desirable outcome. 
Although the court’s description of the People’s voice is democratic 
and inspiring, it may be too ambitious. Sovereign authorship is sim-
pler and stronger, unlocking merger as an alternative and promising 
area of copyright law. 
                                                                                                         
 203  Code Revision Comm’n, 906 F.3d at 1232–33.  
 204  Id. at 1233; see id. at 1255. 
